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amicable settlements arising out of World War II may yet come
back to harass the administrators of estates and cloud titles in
the years to come unless handled by resort to the courts.
In view of the present state of the law, the proper solution
probably would be legislation similar to that of California, hold-
ing such second marriages, contracted in good faith, valid until
declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction. Such legis-
lation should also include a bar to any collateral attack on the
second marriage, in order to preserve with some degree of cer-
tainty the rights of children or heirs of parties to such marriage.
JOHNSON V. SHRIVER: POWERS, USES AND
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
In Barnard v. Moore,' Mr. Justice Denison said, "We shall
assume, without deciding, that the rule in Shelley's Case is in
force in Colorado, i.e., if a freehold estate be limited to A, re-
mainder to his heirs, he takes a fee simple. .. ."
Johnson v. Shriver 2 comes very close to deciding that the Rule
in Shelley's Case is not in force in Colorado. The interests involved
were created by the following language: " . . . in trust for the
said Ada Conroe, for and during her natural life. . . . Upon the
death of the said Ada Conroe . . . then said property shall vest in
the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe .... .
This language falls squarely within the Rule in Shelley's Case
as that Rule was stated by Mr. Justice Denison. A freehold is
limited to Ada Conroe, remainder to her heirs. Yet it was held,
without referring to the Rule, that Ada Conroe did not take a fee
simple. Is this a repudiation of the Rule, or did the facts bring
this case within an exception to the Rule? This is a difficult ques-
tion.
Ada Conroe's interest was expressly limited to a life estate,
but that of course would not prevent the operation of the Rule-
in fact, it is one of the prerequisites that the ancestor be given
an estate less than a fee simple. Otherwise the interest limited
to his heirs would not be a remainder, but would be an executory
interest, and the Rule applies (except in the case of appointed
interests) only to remainders.
It might be proper to suggest parenthetically that the remark-
able persistence of the Rule seems not to be attributable so much
to a fondness for the feudal doctrine, or to an indifference to mani-
fested intention, as to its modern effectiveness as a means of clear-
ing titles.
'71 Colo. 401, 406, 207 P. 332, . . . (1922).
2- Colo. -, 216 P. 2d 653 (1950). It Is assumed that the reader of these com-




For example, in this very case the Abstract of Record, p. 23,
states that, ".... the abstract (of title) . . . shows two attempts
by the testatrix (Ada Conroe) to alienate parts of the trust prop-
erty in her lifetime, contrary to the provisions of the trust agree-
ment." The lawyers who examined the title for those two grantees
may have relied upon the Rule in Shelley's Case, and they would
surely value its protection now.
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT PREVENT OPERATION OF RULE
There are, in this case of Johnson v. Shriver, several factors
which might appear to prevent the operation of the Rule.
The first such factor is that some of the property was Kansas
land. The descent of that land would of course be determined by
the law of Kansas, and therefore the limitation of a remainder to
"the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe, under the laws of descent
of the State of Colorado . . . " was not, as to the Kansas land, a
limitation to the heirs of Ada Conroe, as such, and so did not fall
within the Rule in Shelley's Case.
If the property had all been Colorado land (as almost all of
it was), the limitation would no doubt have been held to be to Ada
Conroe's heirs in the technical sense required by the Rule. What is
the effect of this situation in which the words mean "heirs" as
applied to Colorado land, but not as to Kansas land? No author-
ity has been found, but it would seem that in such a case the
inapplicability of the Rule to the Kansas land would not affect
its applicability to Colorado land.
Second, as another factor which might appear to exclude the
Rule, there is the spendthrift provision:
We direct that neither the income from said trust estate . . . nor
the principal fund or trust property shall be liable for her [Ada Con-
roe's] debts, past, present or future; nor shall said income or trust
property be subject to the right of any creditor of said beneficiary
to seize the same under any writ or by any proceeding at law or in
equity. And said beneficiary shall not have any power to give, grant,
sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, incumber, or
anticipate the income, or any installment thereof, it being our will
that no right of disposition of any such property shall vest in said ben-
eficiary, except by her will as herein provided.
This language is plain enough; and if the Rule in Shelley's Case
were a rule of construction it could not, in view of this provision
invest Ada Conroe with an alienable estate in fee simple. But the
Rule has never been a rule of construction, but a rule of law; and
spendthrift provisions should not prevent its operation.
3
OSIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 129, note 16 (1936). GRIS-
WOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 277 (1947), cites cases both ways, but the two-
holdings that the rule is not applicable dealt with personalty to which the rule is not
applicable anyhow. Bennet v. Bennet, 217 I1. 434, 75 N.E. 339 '(1905), the first case
cited by Griswold, makes this distinction, "As applied to a devise of real estate, the
position of the appellant [that the Rule in Shelly's Case applies in spite of spendthrift
provisions] is sound .... As applied to gifts or conveyances of personalty the word
'heirs' strictly speaking has no application . . . and the Rule in Shelly's case . . . Is
held to yield to the express intention of the testator."
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Third, another factor which might seem to exclude the Rule,
is the provision by virtue of which the remainder given to the heirs
of Ada Conroe was subject to destruction by an executory limita-
tion-the exercise of a general testamentary power by Ada Conroe.
It is established, however, that the destructibility of the remainder
does not render the Rule in Shelley's Case inapplicable.
4
REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH ESTATES BE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
There remains a fourth factor in this case which probably
does justify the exclusion of the Rule. However this conclusion
is not clear, and the problem seems to merit some discussion. The
Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable only to those situations in
which the estate of the ancestor and the remainder to his heirs are
both legal, and to those in which they are both equitable. In other
words, if one interest is legal and the other is equitable, the Rule
does not apply. In this case the remainder to the heirs of Ada
Conroe is plainly legal:
Upon the death said Ada Conroe, cestui que trust, the trust herein
created shall cease and determine, and when said trust is terminated,
the trust property ... shall immediately vest in and become the prop-
erty of the devisees and legatees named in the will of said Ada Con-
roe, or in the event that said Ada Conroe leaves no will, then said
property shall vest in the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe. ...
There is no duty imposed upon the trustees with respect to
this ultimate remainder-not even a duty to convey. In such a
case it is clear that the remainder is not equitable, but legal. There-
fore, the Rule would be applicable if the life estate of Ada Conroe
were legal; but not if the life estate were equitable. Which is it?
It was obviously intended to be equitable. The Agreement recites,
" . . . we hold the title to said . . . property, in trust for the said
Ada Conroe, for and during her natural life . . . " But the Statute
of Uses was enacted for the very purpose of defeating such inten-
tion. When the Statute is applicable, it converts what was intended
to be an equitable interest into a legal interest.
APPLICABILITY OF STATUTE OF USES
Is the Statute applicable? This is a fairly close question. The
property involved is a freehold interest in land, and there is no use
upon a use. This makes the question turn entirely upon whether
the trust is active or passive. If it is passive, the Statute of Uses
converts the life interest of Ada Conroe into a legal estate in
spite of the clear intention of the parties that the interest should
be equitable.
There were conferred upon Ada Conroe, "the beneficiary,"
powers which are usually exercised by a trustee:
4 SIMES, ibid at note 15.
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We hereby appoint said Ada Conroe, our agent to control and
manage said trust estate; to rent and receive the income therefrom;
to apply said income, primarily to the payment of interest upon the
incumbrances thereon, taxes and repairs; and to use the remainder
of said income for her personal support and benefit.
What is there left for "the trustees" to do? Nothing, unless
it be found in that paragraph which provides that,
If it shall become or appear advisable to said trustees, during the
period of said trusteeship, to sell or transfer any of said trust prop-
erty, the same shall only be done by deed of conveyance executed by
all of said trustees; and if any of said trustees shall die during the
life of said trust, the remaining trustees, or trustee shall continue
said trust.
The provisions of this paragraph may appear to be superfluous
because they merely state, in effect, that the trustees shall be
deemed to be joint tenants, and this common law rule has not
been affected by statute in Colorado. In this case, however, there
are other circumstances which the draftsman may have had in
mind, and which would amply justify the inclusion of this para-
graph.
The trust property consisted of ten tracts of land owned by
Emma M. Shriver as tenant in severalty; three tracts owned by
Clifford A. Conroe as tenant in severalty; and one tract owned by
Clifford A. Conroe and Richard H. Conroe as joint tenants. No
attempt was made expressly to convey the legal title to these tracts
to the trustees. The only instrument signed by the three owners
merely recited:
Now, therefore, these presents witness that we hereby jointly and
severally declare, that we hold the title to said above mentioned and
described property, in trust for the said Ada Conroe ...
It is to be noticed that this joint and several declaration did not
purport to be descriptive of the tenancy by which the trustees were
to hold. (There is of course no such thing as a joint and several
tenancy.)
Furthermore, the words, "we hold title to the said above men-
tioned and described property in trust . . . " do not say, " we jointly
hold title," and might well mean, "we each hold title to the said
property as above mentioned and described." This meaning would
refer back to that language in which the property was mentioned
and described as follows:
Whereas the undersigned Emma M. Sbriver is the owner of the
following described property; . . .
And whereas, Clifford A. Conroe is the owner of the following
described property; . . .
And whereas Clifford A. Conroe and Richard H. Conroe are joint
owners of the following described property.
It would appear, therefore, since there had been no transfer of
the legal title of any of these tracts, that they could be conveyed
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by the separate deeds of the respective legal owners, without any
participation by the other parties to the agreement.
It seems not unlikely, therefore, that the draftsman consid-
ered it proper to clarify this aspect of the transaction by the ex-
plicit provision that the sale "or transfer of any of said trust prop-
erty ... shall only be done by deed of conveyance executed by all of
said trustees ......
Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the words which intro-
duced this paragraph, "If it shall become or appear advisable to
said trustees, during the period of said trusteeship, to sell or trans-
fer . . . " were intended to be anything more than introductory.
The power to sell is not expressly conferred; it is assumed.
If the purpose had been to confer a power or to impose a duty
it would seem that some standard for the determination of advisabil-
ity would have been mentioned, such as, "in their own uncontrolled
discretion," or "for the best interests of the said Ada Conroe."
Nothing like that appears. Nor is there any provision as to what
should be done with the proceeds of such sale, whether they shall
be reinvested in land, whether they shall be reinvested in some
other way, or whether they shall be paid over to the beneficiary.
The absence of some such provision also suggests that the para-
graph was not included for the purpose of conferring a power or
imposing a duty. The inference would seem rather to be that the
power of the trustees to sell and transfer the legal title to their
own tracts of land was taken for granted, and that it was the
draftsman's intention merely to create by this paragraph legal
relationships like those which would have resulted from a convey-
ance of the land to the trustees in joint tenancy.
A Passive Trust?
In view of these considerations it might well have been found
that the attempted trust was passive, and that it was therefore
executed by the Statute of Uses. Two cases in which the beneficiary
was authorized to exercise powers comparable to those conferred
in this case upon Ada Conroe are Craig v. Kinsey 5 and City Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Evanston v. Pearsons.6 In the former,
the trustees were given somewhat more power, and the trust was
not executed; in the latter, the trustees were given somewhat less
power, and the trust was executed.
If this trust was passive, then it was executed by the Statute
of Uses, in which case both the life estate of Ada Conroe and the
remainder to her heirs would be legal, and the Rule in Shelley's
Case would be applicable. The result would be that the remainder
which seemed to be limited to the heirs of Ada Conroe would be
vested in her in fee simple, and her life estate would merge in the
5370 11. 32, 18 N.E. 2d 895 (1938).
6307 I1. App. 548, 30 N.E. 2d 774 (1941).
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remainder, so that she would have a present legal estate in fee
simple in possession.
The foregoing argument finds some support in the conduct
of Ada Conroe. The order of the District Judge recites:
It is obvious that the testatrix [Ada Conroe] had erroneous ideas
as to what power she had under the trust agreement. In the first
paragraph of the will she directs that all of her just debts, except
those that are secured by liens be paid. This would indicate that
she thought she owned this property and was liable for the lien in-
debtedness thereon. And further, the abstract produced shows two
attempts by the testatrix to alienate parts of the trust property in
her lifetime, contrary to the provisions of the trust Agreement.
It is not known how far these "attempts" were carried, nor whether
the trustees acquiesced.
A Fee Simple With Appendant Power of Appointment?
If Ada Conroe did have a present legal estate in fee simple,
she could, as owner, convey it inter vivos or by will, or let it de-
scend to her heirs. Could she also have, appendant to the same
land, a power of appointment, as distinguished from a power to
convey? The Restatement of the Law of Property says that in the
United States no such power appendant can exist; but the ortho-
dox cases at common law do recognize such powers.
To summarize: if the trust were passive, and if the Rule in
Shelley's Case were in force in Colorado, and if the Restatement's
rule that powers appendant do not exist were the law of Colorado,
then of course the creditor of Ada Conroe could reach the property
because it was her own legal estate in fee simple.
7
But the decision is otherwise. Therefore it must be concluded
that the trust was active, or that the Rule in Shelley's Case is not
in force in Colorado, or that powers appendant do exist in Colo-
rado. None of these problems inherent in the case is mentioned
in the abstract of record, the briefs, or the opinion.
EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY PROVISION IN WILL
So much for the problems that were not mentioned in the
opinion. Many others were. One such problem, together with the
court's answer, was, in part, as follows :s
FIRST: Where a power of appointment was created, as herein-
above stated, will an exercise of that power in favor of creditors
result from a statement in the will of the donee of the power that all
the just debts of testatrix [donee] shall be paid?
The question is answered in the negative. . . .. There is no pre-
sumption that the direction to pay debts, contained in the will was
Another effect of the execution of the trust by the Statute of Uses would be to
render invalid the attempted restraints on alienation, even though the Rule in Shelley's
Case were not in force, because no provision is made for the termination of the life
estate upon attempted alienation. This question was of course moot because the life
tenant had died, but it is worth noting because the opinion assumes the validity of
these restraints.
8216 P. 2d 653, 656-657 (1950).
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in fact an exercise of the power of appointment possessed by testatrix.
An intention to execute the power must be affirmatively shown, and
that intention must be so clearly established that the transaction is
not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation.
In its consideration of this problem the court makes no refer-
ence to a fact which it had already mentioned in another connec-
tion, and which should have been decisive on this point, namely:
"the fact that there were no assets in the estate also stands ad-
mitted." Therefore, the first paragraph of the will could have no
effect whatsoever unless it were as the exercise of the power. In
such circumstances the case falls squarely within the proposition
above quoted from the opinion, " . . . that the transaction is not
fairly susceptible of any other interpretation."
This rule has been recognized in two other Colorado cases.
Barnard v. Moore, supra, which the court cites for another proposi-
tion in its discussion of this very point, contains this language:
It seems that a deed containing no reference to the power will
not be regarded as an exercise thereof, unlesc otherwise there would
be nothing for the conveyance to operate on.
The other Colorado case, Bennett v. Laws 9 is mentioned infra.
The three cases upon which the court relies in concluding
that the direction to pay debts did not exercise the power are all
distinguishable on this very point, because in none of them did it
appear, as it does here, "that there were no assets in the estate."
Those three cases contain this distinguishing language:
The will . . . makes no reference to the power or to the property
covered by it, and there is no evidence that it would be inoperative
without the aid of the power. There is no evidence of the kind, con-
dition, or value of the property, if any, owned by the testator.10 ...
Testatrix died possessed of an individual estate and also of an
estate over which she had power of appointment .... We agree with
the court below that there is nothing in the above-quoted portion of
the will or in other parts of it, to show any intention other than that
testatrix's individual estate." . . .
The principal question upon this appeal is whether there has
been a blending of the individual estate of testatrix with an estate
over which she had a power of appointment." . . .
One who reads the opinion in Johnson v. Shriver might be
justified in assuming that counsel for the creditor had overlooked
the decisive importance of the fact that there were no assets in
the estate. This assumption is supported by the court's statement
that, "Claimant does not here directly argue that the direction to
pay debts, standing alone, would show an exercise of the power of
appointment."
'59 Colo. 290, 149 P. 439 (1915).
,0 Emery v. Emery, 325 Il1. 212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927).
In Re Valentine's Estate, 297 Pa. 99, 146 At]. 453 (1929).
12In Re Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. 2d 360 (1940).
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It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find the following
language in the claimant's brief:
The first theory of the claimant is that Ada Conroe was exer-
cising her power to give the property described in the trust agree-
ment to anyone she might name in her will when in the first para-
graph of her will she directed the payment of all her just debts as
soon as convenient after her decease and intended that her creditors
should be and therefore are her first appointees. This theory is
strengthened by the consideration of the third paragraph of her will
in which only the residue of the estate of which she is seized or
possessed or which she is empowered to convey by will is conveyed
to her children named. Although the testatrix does not specifically
mention the power in this first paragraph, viewing the will as a
whole, considering the fact she had no other property, it is logical
to conclude that she intended to and did make her creditors her
appointees and that her debts should be satisfied before the appointees
named in the residuary clause should receive any part of her estate.
The claimant's position that it is unnecessary for the instrument
or a particular sentence or paragraph thereof to mention the power
in order to be construed to be an exercise of the power where it can-
not otherwise operate because of the fact that the donee had no prop-
erty upon which it could operate has been established as the rule in
Colorado in these words:
"It is thoroughly settled everywhere that, when the instrument
does not mention the power but could have no material operation ex-
cept as executing it, it shall be treated as intended to have that effect."
Bennett v. Laws, 59 Colo. 290, quoting from Reeves on Real Property,
Vol. 2, P. 1237.
The fact that the will was made December 2, 1946, less than six
months before she became deceased May 25, 1947, is another surround-
ing circumstance favorable to the position of claimant.
The case of Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U.S. 315, states that where a will
is made shortly before the death of the appointor, it may be presumed
that the financial condition of the appointor was the same as at the
time of death, and that the provisions of her will should be construed
upon the premise that the financial condition of the appointor was
the same at the time the will was made as at the time of her death. In
that case, the court held the testatrix was exercising her power of
appointment because she willed more property than she had without
considering the property which she had the power to convey.
It follows from the application of the above mentioned rules of
law to the undisputed facts that the donee of the power intended to
and did exercise the power given her in the trust agreement.
It is apparent that the claimant did argue the point, pertinently
and logically, and for two pages of the brief.
As further bearing on the intention of the testatrix to exer-
cise the power by directing that her debts be paid, it is worthwhile
to note that the district judge stated in his conclusions of law, "It
is the opinion of the Court that the testatrix treated all of this
property as her own and intended that her debts should be paid
therefrom. . . . " This would seem to have required a holding in
favor of the creditor, but the district court further concluded that:
It is the opinion of the court that the testatrix by this will made
no attempt to exercise the power of appointment contained in the
DICTA
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trust agreement and had no more right to dispose of this property as
her own than she had in the attempted conveyances she made in her
lifetime.
In other words, even though Ada Conroe could have appointed
the "trust property" to her creditors (or to her own estate, since
the power was general), she did not attempt to do so, but she
tried instead to treat the property as her own-an attempt which
the district judge held to be invalid as an effort to violate the
spendthrift provisions of the agreement.
The district judge's concluding statement on this point was,
The only relief she was warranted in extending to her creditors
under the provisions of the trust agreement was to make a specific
bequest to such of her creditors as she desired of such property as
she should select.
This language is quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court and
is followed by the statement, "we are in accord with this view."
Insofar as this conclusion is based upon the spendthrift pro-
visions of the agreement, it is weakened by the--dubious validity
of the attempt to create a merely equitable life estate in Ada Con-
roe. But if the validity of the trust and of the spendthrift provi-
sions be assumed, then it is evident that the court is admitting
that those provisions do not preyent an effective exercise of the
power in favor of creditors-in 'fact the court shows just how it
should be done-in a way Which is not suggested by the terms of
the agreement.
What the court appears really to be saying is that the testatrix
could not treat the property over which she had a general testa-
mentary power as if it were her own estate. No authority for
such a proposition has been found other than one Maryland case
decided in 1888.13 The rule to the contrary is supported by abun-
dant authority.
14
With respect then, to the first question set forth in the opinion
it would appear that on the facts of this case the answer might
properly have been in the affirmative.
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS As AGAINST APPOINTEES
After having answered the first question in the negative, the
court next finds that the power was exercised by the second and
third paragraphs of the will, and then proceeds to consider the
third question:15
THIRD: In exercising the power of appointment by naming the
original donors of the power, in whom the legal title to the property
remained prior to the exercise of the power, did the donee appoint
mere "volunteers" and thereby give rise to rights in her creditors?
13 Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888).
14 See cases collected in 93 A.L.R. 967.
15216 P. 2d 653, 658 (1950).
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This question, as stated, obviously begs the question as to
whether the rule in favor of creditors of the donee of a general
power is applicable only when the appointment is to volunteers,
and this same assumption is made in the court's answer :16
The rule for which claimant contends is stated as follows: . . .
If such a power . . . is exercised in favor of the one who pays no
consideration, "a volunteer," the property is thereby made assets in
equity for payments of the donee's debts. . . . Thus, even under
this rule the respondents must be shown to have the status of "volun-
teers" before the creditor claimant is entitled to the relief sought.
The court finds that the appointment was not to "volunteers",
and then concludes, "On claimant's own theory she accordingly
fails to bring the case within the rule for which she contends." This
statement of "the claimant's own theory" is more narrow than
that contained in the brief of the plaintiff in error, wherein claim-
ant argued:
The rule of law that the property covered by a general power of
appointment . . . is liable for the debts of the donee at her death ...
[applies] .. .where she appoints the property to volunteers and in
some instances to creditors.
. ..Where [as in this case] the power is to convey by will, the
limitation [of the rule to appointments] to "volunteers" does not
apply.
The point is that with respect to conveyances generally, and
regardless of powers of appointment, a debtor may prefer one
creditor to another by a conveyance inter vivos (subject of course
to avoidance by trustee in bankruptcy) ; but no such preference
can be effectuated by a will.
A further indication that the claimant did not concede that
her claim would be good only as against "volunteers," is found in
her statement of the case wherein she apparently placed her chief
reliance upon State Street Trust Co. v. KisselU.17 That statement
is in part as follows:
The court found that the appointees were creditors of the grand-
child at the time the will was made and at the time of his death
- . .and that the share of the grandchild should pass to all of the
donee's creditors, not by will but by the rule of law that: "Equity
seizes the property on its way from the donor to the appointees and
applies it to the satisfaction of the debts of the appointor."
Even if it were assumed that the rule in favor of creditors
applied only when the appointment was to volunteers, it was neces-
sary to determine whether the appointees in this case were volun-
teers. On this point the court's opinion is as follows:
We adopt the words of the learned trial judge, who said, in dis-
posing of this point: "In this case the rule is sought to be enforced
16 Ibid.
17 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E. 2d 25 (1939).
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against the owners of the property, and under no stretch of the im-
agination can they be considered volunteers .. "
It may have been easier for the court to adopt these words of the
trial judge than to explain them, especially in view of the fact
that in the preceding paragraph of the opinion, the court gave
the ordinary meaning to "volunteer," namely, "one who pays no
consideration."
DOES PROPERTY BECOME EQUITABLE ASSETS FOR CREDITORS?
A fourth question was propounded and answered as follows:
FOURTH: In this jurisdiction is the rule to be adopted that,
where a general power of appointment is exercised by the donee in
favor of a volunteer the appointive property becomes assets in equity
for payment of the donee's debts?
. . . While an answer to this question is not essential to an
affirmance of the judgment, for the reasons already stated, the ques-
tion is presented by this record, and we deem it advisable to give
the answer for the guidance of counsel in determining possible future
action with relation to those who took property as volunteers under
the terms of the second paragraph of the will. Our considered opinion
is that the rule stated in the question should not be adopted in Colo-
rado. We believe that better reasoning is to be found in the cases
from jurisdictions which do not recognize the rule.
The court then cites several cases, each of which will be con-
sidered in the order in which it was cited by the Colorado court.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony,"' is somewhat
weakened by this language:
If we were convinced of the soundness of the English doctrine,
there are circumstances surrounding this case which would cause us
to refuse to direct this complainant to turn over these trust estates to
the executor to be taken by him into a foreign jurisdiction there to
be administered. The respondent executor has not satisfied us that
the assets of the estate of Miss Beckwith upon a prudent administra-
tion are insufficient for the payment of her debts.
In Re Howald's Trust 19 is somewhat weakened by this lan-
guage:
The facts of the instant case are to be distinguished . . . in that
[the donee) after exercising the power of appointment, expressly pro-
vided: "This bequest is subject to all my just debts" . . . It is our
conclusion that the plaintiff trustee . . . should pay to the executor
an amount sufficient to comply with this provision of the will. . . .
It therefore follows that so much of the appointed property as is
required for the payment of debts will be paid by the plaintiff trustee
to the executor and thereafter it comes a part of her estate.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn 20 involved the
construction of section 402 (e) of the Revenue Act of 1919. The
court said:
"49 R. I. 339, 142 Atil. 531 (1928).
" 65 Ohio App. 191, 29 N. E. 2d 575 (1940).
34 F. 2d 600 (1929).
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The Congress thus had the power to tax any transmission of prop-
erty affected by death even though by the law of the descendent's
domicile such property was not part of his estate . . . therefore con-
clude that the property passing under the exercise of Mrs. Cole's
power of appointment was "property passing under a general power
of appointment," within the meaning of the Revenue Law.
The rule in favor of creditors was mentioned in discussing the
history of the Revenue Act, but was held not to be material in
this case.
Balls v. Damipman 21 is a square decision against the creditor,
and explains the general theory of powers, but does not deal with
the rule in favor of creditors.
Cutting v. Cutting 22 contains this distinguishing language,
We think too that it is clearly indicated in the revisers' notes to
the Revised Statutes . . . that it was then conceded that he English
rule [in favor of creditors] was the law of this state at that time. And
we need not now go farther in that inquiry, for we have come to a
conclusion . . . that the English rule has been abrogated by our
Legislature.
Boyle v. Smyth Co.23 is commented upon in 97 A.L.R. at 1072
as follows:
In Boyle v. John M Smyth Co.... the court said that while that
doctrine (in favor of creditors) expressed the general rule in Eng-
land, which had been followed by courts of high authority in this
country, the doctrine had been severely criticized, and, in so far as
the briefs disclosed, it had never been approved by the courts in
Illinois. Attention is, however, called to the Illinois cases on page
1514 of the earlier annotation (59 A.L.R. 1510) recognizing the Eng-
lish doctrine. It further appears that the question did not arise on
the facts, as there were no creditors.
St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette 24 is also somewhat weak-
ened by this language,
The English doctrine was embodied in our statutory law at that
time . . . the statute was enacted in 1796 and is to be found in Lit-
tell's Laws, page 597 . . . moreover, may it not be said, well and
logically, paralleling the line of thought of the New York court in
Cutting v. Cutting, supra, that since our Kentucky statute was subse-
quently repealed, it was the intent of the Legislature that he doc-
rine itself should be abrogated . . . ?
One more question: What should become of those two lots
in Wichita, Kansas?
T. G. M.
-69 Md. 390, 16 AtU. 16 (1888).
86 N. Y. 522 (1881).
23248 Ill. App. 57 (1928).
24 259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W. 2d 471 (1935).
